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Abstract—The proliferation of sensor devices has introduced
exciting possibilities such as the Internet of Things (IoT). Machine
to Machine (M2M) communication underpins efficient interac-
tions within such infrastructures. The resource constraints and
ad-hoc nature of these networks have significant implications
for security in general and with respect to intrusion detection
in particular. Consequently, contemporary solutions mandating
a stable infrastructure are inadequate to fulfill these defining
characteristics of M2M networks. In this paper, we present
COLIDE (COLlaborative Intrusion Detection Engine) a novel
framework for effective intrusion detection in the M2M networks
without incurring high energy and communication cost on the
participating host and edge nodes. The framework is envisioned
to address challenges such as flexibility, resource constraints,
and the collaborative nature of the M2M networks. The paper
presents a detailed system description along with its formal
and empirical evaluation using Contiki OS. Our evaluation
for different communication scenarios demonstrates that the
proposed approach has limited overhead in terms of energy
utilization and memory consumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of sensor devices has increased dramatically over
the last few years leading to their proliferation across diverse
domains such as wearables, intelligent appliances, and vehi-
cles. As these devices have the ability to be connected to a
network, it introduces exciting possibilities such as the Internet
of Things (IoT). IoT has received significant attention as a
disruptive technology and is considered fundamental to the
networks of the future. A recent study from Gartner predicted
the number of sensor devices to increase to 8.4 billion in
2017 [1]. This has direct impact on industrial applications such
as automotive industry, commercial security cameras, as well
as consumer applications such as wearables, smart TVs, and
smart meters.
A typical IoT network consists of devices with resource
constraints such as limited processing power, energy resources,
and communication range. In view of these constraints, 6LoW-
PAN (IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Net-
works) [2], [3],[4], allows the resource constrained sensor
devices to send and receive information as IPv6 packets.
Therefore, it facilitates communication between low power
wireless personal area networks using IPv6 by performing
header compression and fragmentations to fit the large sized
IPv6 packets in the smaller link layer frames such as those
defined by IEEE 802.15.4 [5]. This enables the things to use
the IP based Internet, leveraging standards and technologies
developed over the last few decades. For a typical LoWPAN,
this connectivity is achieved by using an edge router which
facilitates connectivity among the devices participating within
a LoWPAN as well as with the Internet. The focus of our
research is to investigate and address novel challenges for
security of M2M networks which we believe are two-fold:
firstly, these devices are typically resource constrained thereby
limiting their ability to host sophisticated security system.
Secondly, the ad-hoc nature of 6LoWPAN network allows
devices to connect to other devices at runtime typically for
short time periods therefore creating a volatile infrastructure.
However, current approaches to intrusion detection for 6LoW-
PAN networks are generally focused at standalone intrusion
detection components integrated within the host or the cluster
head. These approaches are limited in that they consider a
restricted view of the events within an M2M network and
therefore are limited in their ability to address complex, multi-
stage attacks. We believe that due to the adhoc nature of
such systems, a collaborative intrusion detection approach will
enable the edge routers to use collective information from
various devices to have rigorous view of the characteristics
of events visible to them.
Our contribution presented via this paper is COLIDE - a
collaborative intrusion detection framework for M2M based
IoT networks, that leverages collaboration among IoT nodes
for effective intrusion detection without incurring high com-
munication, processing and energy resources. To this end,
the framework envisages collective use of the information
from host and network based detection systems. We believe
correlating the events from multiple devices can facilitate
minimizing the false positive rate, improve the detection rate
under distributed attacks and also minimize the workload for
the end host. The proposed framework is envisioned to address
challenges such as the flexibility, resource constraints of the
nodes, and the collaborative nature of the M2M networks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section
II describes the related work regarding intrusion detection
in an IoT network. Section III presents our collaborative
approach and Z-notations for intrusion detection in an IoT
network. A detailed description of the experimentation setup
is presented in section IV with thorough evaluation presented
in section V. Section VI presents an overall discussion about
the effectiveness of the scheme followed by conclusions of the
paper in section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Intrusion detection within IoT systems has received signif-
icant attention over the last few years. For instance, in [6],
Raza et al. presented an intrusion detection system for IoT
taking into consideration the unique network elements of IoT
i.e. network protocols developed for the constrained devices
including RPL (IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and
Lossy Networks) [7] and 6LowPAN [3],[4]. They proposed a
hybrid intrusion detection architecture which included light-
weight elements within the sensor nodes along with a central
node at the 6LOWPAN Border Router (6BR) node. The
work presented is different from COLIDE framework in that
COLIDE only focuses on the generic IoT system which can
include devices of any types (constrained or unconstrained)
whereas [6] have specifically designed for the constrained
devices. Furthermore, our proposed system is also able to
function within an untrustworthy and flexible environment
where different devices can form ad-hoc networks without pre-
vious handshakes to deliver a certain service in a coordinated
manner.
In [8], Sheikhan and Bostani presented an intrusion detec-
tion similar to the [6] such as; both focus on using the network
traffic of the devices for intrusion detection purposes, consider
the resource-constrained 6LowPAN devices based system, and
finally, both approaches are focused on the sinkhole and
selective-forwarding attacks. However, the proposed COLIDE
framework is capable of working with diverse devices and a
range of issues including different types of attacks, inherent
flexibility of the IoT networks, and the lack of trust among
the participant devices. In [9], Kasinathan et al. developed an
architecture to protect against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
within 6LowPAN networks. In [10] Jun and Chi correlated
the large number of alerts and network traffic as a part of
intrusion detection. Le et al. [11] investigated the security
aspects of Routing Protocol for Low-power and lossy network
(RPL). This work is similar to the COLIDE framework in that
it also uses a network of monitoring nodes, which are used to
sniff and monitor communications within their neighborhood.
Obaid et al. [12] presented one of the early efforts to develop
an intrusion detection system for IP-based wireless sensor
networks. The authors presented RIDES which is a hybrid
IDS combining both anomaly and misuse based intrusion
detection approaches. Although our approach has similarities
with [12] in that it also uses both signature and anomaly based
detection systems, however [12] proposed to use both detection
engines at node and edge router level. We believe this has
significant performance overheads especially at node level due
to the limited resources available. On the contrary, we propose
using signature based intrusion detection system at the node
level and the anomaly based IDS at the edge router thereby
significantly reducing the performance overhead.
In [13], Abduvaliyev et al. presented an effort to develop
an energy efficient intrusion detection system for wireless
sensor networks. The proposed system is a combination of
anomaly and misuse based intrusion detection aimed at pro-
tecting the cluster heads which the authors believe is the
first target for any attack on WSN. In [14] Wenchao et al.
used K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) machine learning algorithm
to identify malicious nodes in the wireless sensor networks.
Saeed et al. [15] proposed intrusion detection and prevention
system using random neural networks. However, modelling the
behaviour patterns of device usage and processing it via multi-
stage neural networks could have a high-energy consumption.
The confidentiality and integrity of data exchanged between
IoT devices and the core system can be protected through
the use of cryptography mechanism [16], [17]. However,
the energy resources required for encrypting the data make
these approaches infeasible to be deployed in a real system
implementation.
In [18], Zhou et al. proposed a decentralized multi-
dimensional alert correlation system for the collaborative
intrusion detection. The system consist of two algorithms im-
plemented in a fully distributed CIDS, first algorithm clusters
alerts locally at each device, before reporting significant alert
patterns to a global correlation stage. The authors in [19]
proposed a self-adapting, knowledge-driven IDS for IoT net-
work running different communication protocols. Sedjelmaci
et al. proposed an efficient and lightweight intrusion detection
mechanism for securing the vehicular network in [20]. The ap-
proaches utilizes the rules-based intrusion detection to identify
different type of attacks. In [21], Alessandro et al. proposed
an IDS architecture for the IoT that uses the Raspberry Pi
equipped with Snort intrusion detection system. The authors
in [22] proposed intrusion detection system for the visual
sensor networks based on traffic pattern matching and then
a hierarchical self-organizing map (HSOM) is employed to
learn traffic patterns and detect intrusions.
In summary, COLIDE makes contribution to the existing
knowledge within intrusion detection for IoT networks with
respect to working with diverse devices and a range of
issues including different types of attacks, limited node-level
resources and the inherent flexibility of the IoT networks.
III. COLIDE: A COLLABORATIVE INTRUSION DETECTION
FRAMEWORK FOR M2M
COLIDE is a collaborative intrusion detection system for
IoT infrastructures which takes into account resource con-
straints, flexibility and diversity of devices and emphasizes
cooperative nature of such systems. A graphical representation
of the COLIDE framework is presented in Fig 1 which
presents its different components and interactions between
them.
As presented in Fig 1, intrusion detection is performed at
two levels, the node level and the edge router level. These are
described below in more detail.
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Fig. 1 Building block of collaborative intrusion detection system for IoT.
A. Node level detection
The node level detection module is envisaged to be a light-
weight module present at all end-hosts (sensor nodes). This
module is envisioned to take advantage of the unique visibility
offered by a node level system to improve the overall intrusion
detection. In this regard, we propose using signature based
intrusion detection within nodes due to its efficiency with
respect to consumption of computational resources as com-
pared with anomaly based detection. Furthermore, the choice
of implementation for network vs host based monitoring at
node level is rendered application specific as it will influence
the types of attack that can be protected against. For instance,
a Denial of Service (DoS) attack targeted to flood specific
nodes within a LoWPAN can be detected by monitoring
network traffic whereas a backdoor channel attack targeted
at gaining unauthorized access to a node can be detected by
monitoring system events. The detection engine for the node
level module therefore processes the information generated by
the monitor(s) using existing signatures to detect any attack
attempts.
In order to aid formal representation, let us define an event
within a given host H as Ehi. As the proposed system is flexible
in terms of implementation of the host based component,
this event can represent a system event such as a system
call or a network event such as a network packet. In both
scenarios, Ehi will be composed of a number of parameters
which will be important to decide if an event is malicious
or non-malicious. For instance, for a network packet, these
parameters can include protocol, inter-arrival time, packet size
etc. Therefore, Ehi can be represented as:
Ehi : {pr1, pr2, pr3, · · · prn}
where prn is a specific parameter for an event. Within the
context of the above scenario, the Detection Engine DE is
expected to categorize Ehi as malicious or non-malicious. The
intrusion detection policy Ph is used to contribute towards this
decision. Therefore, if SEhi represents the state of an event Ehi,
the following can be represented as the intrusion detection
function.
SEhi : DE(Ehi,Ph)
We define the following data models to be used throughout
our formal description.
EH: a set of events for the host H
SE: state of an event; it can be malicious or non-malicious
SEH: state of an event for host H;
PH: Detection policy for host H
HOSTS: a set of hosts within a LoWPAN
[Node Level Intrusion Detection]
∆HostID
EHID? : N
EHi? : EH
PHi? : PH
SEHi? : SE
EHID > 0
EH 6=<>
PH 6=<>
SEH 6=<>
if EHi ∈ EH then
SEHi = DE(EHi,PHi)
if SEHi = Malicious then
Intrusion Response(EHi, SEHi)
B. Edge router detection
An edge router is an important component within IoT
systems as it enables connectivity between the LoWPAN(s)
and the Internet. We envisage to leverage the enhanced com-
putational capabilities of edge routers to achieve rigorous
intrusion detection for IoT systems. In particular, the edge
router detection module is envisaged to monitor traffic for
LoWPAN(s) attached to it thereby monitoring traffic for all
the devices within a LoWPAN. Among others, this enables
detection of attacks affecting multiple devices within a LoW-
PAN due to the level of visibility offered by the edge router.
Within the proposed system, the edge router detection
module has three components: Alert Collector, Correlation
Agent, and Detection Agent. As the edge router is expected
to monitor all the devices within a LoWPAN, a method is
required to identify threats/alerts for individual sensors. Alert
Collector is to achieve this function by communicating with
individual IoT devices to gather alerts from the node level
monitoring components. A typical intrusion is usually not an
isolated event that can be achieved within a single transaction
or network event but it is usually a series of steps each of
which may target a specific vulnerability with the aim to
achieve the overall successful intrusion. Correlation Agent
component is made to facilitate countermeasures for such
attacks by correlating malicious events at network and system
levels as monitored by the node level monitors. This enables
improved visibility into the events within IoT devices and
facilitates the overall intrusion detection process. Historically,
anomaly based intrusion detection approaches have demon-
strated better efficiency especially with respect to detection
of complex, multistage, and zero day attacks however at the
cost of increased resource consumption. Due to the increased
capability of edge router devices, we propose implementing
anomaly based intrusion detection at the edge router. The
Detection Engine at the edge router is envisioned to achieve
this by making use of the alerts collected and correlated by
the Alert Collection and alert Correlation components. The
Global Detection Enactor (GDE) has three subcomponents i.e.
Detection Agent, Correlation Agent (CA), and Alert Collector
(AC). As the GDE is responsible for a LoWPAN, it is expected
to monitor hosts within that LoWPAN. Within the context
of multi-stage attack detection, we envisage DA to have a
profound role in assessing the correlation between independent
events and envisage a scheme inspired by [23]. The details
of these components are envisioned to be included in the
extended version of this paper.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The implementation for the COLIDE framework was
achieved in Contiki OS, the operating system for IoT used
widely in research and industry [24]. The evaluation was
performed using Contiki v2.7 and its built-in emulator Cooja
[25].
A. IoT environment
The proposed IoT system is presented in Fig 2. It consists
of a Border Router (BR) that acts as the DODAG root for the
6LoWPAN network and connects it to the Internet through a
SLIP interface to a computer. This computing unit has higher
processing power than the IoT devices.
The first tier of nodes that are a part of the 6LoWPAN are
referred to as routers/IDS nodes and can forward messages
to the root as well as sending periodic informaThe first tier
of nodes that are a part of the 6LoWPAN are referred to as
routers/IDS nodes and can forward messages to the root as
well as sending periodic information regarding the behavior
of other nodes under them. Information such as source and
destination IP/Port of the messages being sent. The IDS nodes
are always one hop away from the root.
tion regarding the behavior of other nodes under them. Infor-
mation such as source and destination IP/Port of the messages
being sent. The IDS nodes are always one hop away from the
root.
The malicious nodes are located in the second tier and can
only join the network through one of the router nodes in the
first tier. Its location can vary but for the sake of simplicity
and to retain focus, we demonstrate experimentation with only
one malicious node that will always be two hops away from
the root. The experimentation within this setup have been
performed with Cooja using Tmote Sky motes [26]. Tmote
Sky uses CC2420 IEEE802.15.4 transceiver and has 48kb of
flash and 10kb of RAM. The simulated network was created
with one BR, 5 router nodes, and a malicious node. In order to
simulate the mobile behaviour of the IoT devices, the location
of the malicious node was changed between simulation runs.
However, due to the performance of RPL, the information
it sends is always forwarded through its preferred parent,
normally the router node closest to it. We have conducted
experimentation in order to measure a baseline to use to
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Fig. 2: Experimental Setup
compare the performance of the proposed IDS system. This is
done by simulating the network shown in the above mentioned
figure without the presence of the malicious node. Router
nodes in the baseline setup do not have any special additional
code, they act as RPL routers and exchange only RPL control
messages among themselves and the root. Another issue that
we have taken into consideration is the Radio Duty Cycle
(RDC). In WSN, the rate of data transmission is usually low
when compared to other networks. And so, it is not logical
to keep the radio on all the time when there are no active
transmissions in order to save the power of the nodes. This
gave birth to many RDC protocols that control the rate which
nodes can turn on or off their radios in between transmissions.
In Contiki OS, the prominent RDC protocol is referred to as
ContikiMAC. It takes into consideration the sleep patterns of
different nodes in the network when transmitting or listening.
Contiki also features an RDC protocol that keeps the radio on
all the time whether there is active communication or not. It is
called NullRDC. In this paper, we have simulated the network
both with duty cycling using ContikiMAC and without duty
cycling using NullRDC.
Mainly we are focusing on two parameters, the power con-
sumption of the intrusion detection system and the extra
memory foot print caused by adding the IDS features to the
router nodes. These two metrics are discussed in more details
in the following subsections.
B. Power Measurements
As the nodes in an IoT network are usually resource
constrained, any additional feature to be added to them will
have to take into consideration the extra power consumptions
it adds to the nodes. Power measurements were made using
the powertrace tool included in Contiki OS [27]. This tool
shows the time each mote spends in one of four states. Mainly:
transmitting (Tx), receiving (Rx), low power mode (LPM), and
processing (CPU). Using these values, the energy (E) of a node
can be calculated using the following formula
E(mWs) = Tx∗19.5+Rx∗21.8+LPM∗0.0545+CPU∗1.8 (1)
These values are taken from the Tmote Sky data sheet and
they are shown in Table I.
TABLE I: Base measurement units for Tmote-Sky nodes.
Typical Operating Conditions MIN NOM MAX UNIT
Supply voltage 2.1 3.6 V
Supply voltage during flash memory programming 2.7 3.6 V
Current Consumption: MCU on, Radio RX 21.8 23 mA
Current Consumption: MCU on, Radio TX 19.5 21 mA
Current Consumption: MCU on, Radio off 1800 2400 µA
Current Consumption: MCU idle, Radio off 54.5 1200 µA
Current Consumption: MCU standby 5.1 21.0 µA
Fig. 3: Power Consumption vs Time of the IDS node when
the transmission rate is 1 packet/sec with duty cycling
The average power consumption of a single node can be
calculated using the following formula.
Power(mW) =
Energy(mWs)
Time(s)
(2)
Which takes into consideration the real time each node was
active. Results obtained are discussed in Section V.
C. RAM and ROM usage
Another scarce resource in IoT is the memory of the nodes.
As these nodes are cheap, small, and usually expendable, they
usually do not have memory size akin to personal computers.
For example, the Tmote Sky has only 48kb of flash and 10kb
of RAM. Therefore, we have to measure the footprint of the
code for the baseline setup and for the IDS setup to assess the
extra resources required for our proposed system. Results for
the baseline power and energy consumptions are presented in
the next section for the cases with and without duty cycling.
V. EVALUATION
The simulations were performed using the network topology
shown in the previous section where malicious nodes continu-
ously send packets to the BR. We have tested different values
of the transmission rate primarily for 1, 10, 100, and 1000
packets per second. The IDS nodes will collect information
on the malicious packet. Mainly the source and destination
IP:Port of the malicious message as well as its size. The IDS
will aggregate this information into one packet and send it to
the BR. Two variations on the performance of the IDS node
were tested: Firstly when the nodes send information to the
BR each time they receive 5 packets from the malicious node.
Secondly, when the number of received packets is 10.
The figures below show the power consumption of the IDS
node for the different scenarios simulated. The consumed
power was measured after 5, 10, 15 and 20 minutes of run
time with duty cycling enabled.
The figures 3,4,5 and 6 presented above show that the power
consumption increases as the size of the IDS packet increases.
Fig. 4: Power Consumption vs Time of the IDS node when
the transmission rate is 100packet/sec with duty cycling
Fig. 5: Power Consumption vs Time of the IDS node when
the transmission rate is 1000 packet/sec with duty cycling
However, as is evident from the figures, it is not a significant
increase that may affect the performance of the system greatly.
Additionally, we have tested the system without duty cycling,
i.e when the radio is always on and nodes never sleep. As
expected the results are same for all the scenarios tested as
the CPU consumes negligible energy when compared with the
energy consumed by the radio. And since the radio is always
turned on, the difference in energy consumption between the
different scenarios is not significant which makes the results
for different rates virtually identical to each others. Further
experimentation has been conducted to assess the memory
overhead for the proposed scheme however details of this
evaluation will be included as part of future work.
VI. DISCUSSION
In IoT networks, the IDS can be placed in two places, at
the edge router or at the end host. The IDS placed at the
edge router has the capability of blocking malicious traffic
at the network entry point thus protect the end nodes from
the malicious traffic. However, an IDS at the edge router
might not consider the behaviour of the devices themselves
and may lead to high communication overheads between
Fig. 6: Power Consumption vs Time of the IDS node when
the transmission rate is 1 packet/sec without duty cycling.
nodes and the edge router. On the other hand, an IDS at
the end nodes can monitor the performance of end nodes but
it requires high processing overheads resources (processing,
storage, and energy). The existing IDSs for IoT networks
are mostly isolated and monitor a single device by perform-
ing analysis for the attacks on a local device. There is no
communication taking place between the nodes to make a
collaborative detection. The standalone system will not detect
most advance and distributed attacks. Moreover, standalone
systems will not be able to correlate the traffic statistics or
malicious traffic passing through a number of devices at the
same time. Furthermore, the standalone IDS system always
perform the detection function with respect to seen traffic
on its deployed node, thus allows the intruder to misuse the
device for longer time periods. Naturally, collaboration among
devices could provide the effective defence. In collaboration,
the end devices or IDS at the nodes monitors the traffic patterns
and reports the events to the centralized or distributed system
for event correlation and feedback aggregation. This paper is
a first attempt towards the design of collaborative intrusion
detection system for the IoT network without incurring high
communication or computation overheads. Furthermore, we
have evaluated here only the node level detection. The edge
router detection will be evaluated as part of future work.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has focused on the challenge of intrusion de-
tection for 6LoWPAN based networks taking into account
characteristics such as resource constraints and the M2M
communication among these devices. The paper has proposed
a novel framework for intrusion detection which combines host
and network based approaches to achieve efficient intrusion
detection for IoT using 6LoWPAN. We have implemented and
evaluated the performance of proposed system by performing
simulation for different network scenario in the Contiki oper-
ating system. Our results show that the proposed approach has
small overheads in terms of energy consumption and memory,
and is feasible to use in low energy intrusion detection such
as an IoT scenario. As part of the future work, we envisage
expanding the evaluation to the edge router module and
experimentation involving multi-stage attacks.
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